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The role of regional integration agreements as a determinant of the location of 
FDI has become an increasingly relevant issue for emerging economies. In Latin 
America, the largest effects are likely to be associated with the Free Trade Area of 
the Americas (FTAA). In this regard, there are a number of highly relevant 
questions: For instance, what effect will the FTAA have on FDI from the US and 
Canada to Latin American countries?  How will it affect FDI from the rest of the 
world?  What are the implications for a country such as Mexico, whose 
preferential access to the US may be diluted?  Should we expect to see winners 
and losers, and if so, what determines whether a particular country wins or loses? 
To address these questions, in this paper we look at the impact of regional 
integration on FDI, and attempt to derive conclusions regarding the likely impact 
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Over the last couple of decades, we have seen an increase in the number and depth of regional 
integration agreements (RIAs) around the world. The proliferation of trade agreements has been 
quite widespread. The former European Economic Community has evolved into a single market, 
the European Union (EU), and most of its members have recently adopted a common currency. 
Other European countries have formed free trade areas with the EU or are presently in line for 
EU accession. Likewise, several countries in Southeast Asia have agreed to form the ASEAN 
Free Trade Area.  
The Americas have been no exception to this trend. While a number of regional 
integration agreements have been either created (e.g., Mercosur, NAFTA) or strengthened 
(Comunidad Andina) in the 1990s, some countries such as Mexico and Chile have been actively 
forming bilateral trade agreements with countries both in the continent and in other regions. 
Most importantly, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, currently under negotiation, is supposed 
to create a free trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego by the year 2005. 
At the same time, the world has been experiencing a dramatic surge in flows of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI). During the last two decades, while world trade has increased by a 
factor of 2, flows of FDI have increased by a factor of 10! The surge in FDI involves flows 
toward both developed and developing countries. In fact, foreign direct investment has recently 
become, by a large margin, the main source of foreign financing for emerging markets, and for 
Latin America in particular.  
In light of these developments, the role of regional integration agreements as a 
determinant of the location of FDI has become an increasingly relevant issue for emerging 
economies. While the concerns regarding the impact of RIAs on FDI for countries in Latin 
America may be related to a number of RIA initiatives of different types (sub-regional South-
South agreements, agreements with the EU, etc.), the largest effects are likely to be associated 
with the FTAA. In this regard, there are a number of highly relevant questions: For instance, 
what effect will the FTAA have on FDI from the US and Canada to Latin American countries?  
How will it affect FDI from the rest of the world?  What are the implications for a country such 
as Mexico, whose preferential access to the US may be diluted?  Should we expect to see 
winners and losers, and if so, what determines whether a particular country wins or loses? To 
address these questions, in this paper we look at the impact of regional integration on FDI and 
5
 attempt to derive conclusions regarding the likely impact of the FTAA on countries in Latin 
America.  
A difficulty in assessing the role of regional integration agreements on FDI is that there 
are many channels through which RIAs could potentially have an impact on the location of FDI. 
The impact of regional integration, for example, depends on whether or not the source country is 
a member of the RIA. Thus NAFTA has affected flows of FDI to Mexico from U.S. sources 
differently than it has affected flows to Mexico from German sources. The same is true of 
whether or not the host country is a member of the RIA. NAFTA has affected FDI flows from 
the U.S. to Mexican hosts differently than it has affected flows from the U.S. to countries in 
Central America, which may compete with Mexico as potential FDI sites. In addition, the impact 
of RIAs will likely be a function of specific characteristics of the host countries that make them 
relatively more or less attractive than their RIA partners as a potential location of foreign 
investment. 
Another important consideration that will affect the impact of RIAs on the location of 
foreign investment is the predominant driver of FDI. For instance, a firm may invest abroad in 
order to serve, through sales of a foreign affiliate, a protected market that it could otherwise 
serve only at a high cost through trade. In this case, integration could make the market less 
protected and thus weaken the firm’s motive for this type of FDI, which is known in the 
literature as “horizontal.” Alternatively, the firm may invest abroad in order to exploit different 
countries’ comparative advantages for the various stages of production of a good. After some 
stages the good will cross national boundaries and incur tariff costs; integration reduces such 
costs and so strengthens the firm’s motive for “vertical” FDI.
1 Depending on the motive for 
foreign investment, therefore, the relaxation of trade barriers implicit in an RIA may have 
completely different implications for the location of FDI. For this reason, it is worthwhile to 
discuss in some more detail the nature of horizontal and vertical FDI. 
 
Vertical and Horizontal FDI 
 
Models of vertical FDI typically feature a firm with a corporate facility (which may produce 
management services and R&D) and a production facility; the two are presumed to be 
                                                           
1 For a good discussion of the horizontal and vertical models, see Markusen and Maskus (2001). 
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 geographically separable.
2 As the corporate facility and the production facility require a different 
mix of factors of production, firms localize each “stage” of production to take advantage of 
international differences in factor prices. The production facility produces for the markets in both 
the host country and the source country.  An implication of the model is that no FDI would be 
observed between countries with similar factor endowments: such countries would have similar 
factor prices, eliminating the advantage of geographically separating firms’ corporate and 
production stages.  
Models of horizontal FDI typically feature firms with multiple production facilities 
producing a homogeneous good. One of these facilities is located together with the company’s 
headquarters.
3 Each production facility supplies its domestic market. A key assumption in the 
horizontal model is the presence of firm-level fixed costs, arising from the necessity of one, and 
only one, corporate facility per firm. Firm-level fixed costs imply economies of scale that give 
multinational firms an advantage over domestic firms.  
The volume of horizontal FDI depends on the interplay between firm-level fixed costs, 
plant-level fixed costs, and trade costs.
4 In the absence of trade costs there would be no reason 
for multinational production: firms would concentrate their production in a single facility at a 
single location, incurring plant-level fixed costs only there and serving other markets through 
trade. As trade costs increase, so does multinational production. The presence of firm-level fixed 
costs, coupled with high trade costs, implies that the least costly way to serve local markets is to 
operate local facilities as branches of a multinational firm.  In this sense one can think of 
horizontal multinational activity as a “tariff-jumping” strategy.  
As expected, the empirical implications of the horizontal model of multinational activity 
differ from those of the vertical model. Unlike vertical FDI, horizontal FDI is less likely to be 
found among countries with very different factor proportions. Dissimilar factor proportions 
imply dissimilar factor prices, which induce firms to produce only in the location where the 
factor used intensively has the lowest price, and serve the other market through trade. In 
addition, horizontal FDI is discouraged by differences in country size. With a large country and a 
small country as potential plant locations, a firm is likely to produce only in the country with the 
                                                           
2 Helpman (1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) are early seminal models of vertical FDI. 
3 For models of the horizontal variety, see Markusen (1984), and Markusen and Venables (1998), among others. 
4 Trade costs include both trade barriers and other transaction costs associated with trade, such as transportation 
costs.  
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 large home market and serve the other country through trade, incurring trade costs on a small 
trade volume, but foregoing the cost of establishing a second plant.  
The implications of the horizontal and vertical FDI models seem to suggest that direct 
investment flows from North to South—that is, between countries whose sizes and factor 
proportions differ substantially—are more likely of the vertical kind, while North-North and 
South-South flows are more likely to be of the horizontal kind. But the matter is not so clear-cut. 
First, countries in the North tend to have much lower trade barriers, at least in the manufacturing 
sector. As discussed above, trade barriers, both natural and policy-related, are a key ingredient of 
horizontal FDI. The general absence of high trade barriers among developed countries weakens 
the likelihood that North-North FDI is horizontal. If the tariffs to be jumped are small, there is 
little point in tariff jumping.
5  
Second, horizontal FDI can arise between Northern and Southern countries, even when 
their factor endowments are very different, as long as trade barriers are high enough.  The 
automobile industry in Latin American countries during the period of import substitution (or 
even today, within the protected environment of Mercosur) is an example of horizontal FDI. 
Finally, a large portion of FDI among countries in the North may not be placed squarely within 
either of the two categories discussed by Markusen and Maskus (2001), but instead belong to a 
different class, one in which firms have multiple plants, as in the horizontal model, but produce 
different varieties of a final good, both for export and for domestic consumption, rather than a 
homogeneous good.
6 Thus, unlike the homogeneous good horizontal variety, this type of FDI 
does not substitute trade. 
 
Integration and FDI: What Does the Empirical Literature Say?  
 
Existing data on FDI does not classify it according to its vertical or horizontal nature. It is not 
straightforward to identify the motives for investment with any precision. To a certain extent, 
however, the nature of FDI flows between a pair of countries may be inferred from some 
characteristics of the source and host countries involved: whether the host country’s economy is 
                                                           
5 The importance of tariff jumping as a motive for FDI is contested.  Caves (1996, p. 55) writes that “historical 
evidence strongly confirms the effect of a tariff to lure the MNE’s production behind the barrier”; yet Markusen 
(1997, p. 2) argues that “stylized facts suggest that … direct investment is not caused primarily by trade-barrier-
avoidance.”   
6 Helpman (1985) has modeled multinationals that produce different varieties of a final good in different locations. 
Helpman called this FDI horizontal, a label criticized by Markusen and Maskus (2001). 
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 open or closed, whether the source and host countries are rich or poor, or similar or dissimilar in 
resources. Most existing studies of the impact of RIAs on FDI focus on the latter two variables: 
the countries’ levels of development and the similarity of their resource endowments. The 
relation of regional integration to FDI is thus examined most often by segregating the data into 
cases of North-North integration (between highly developed countries with resource endowments 
abundant in capital and skills), South-South integration (between less developed countries with 
endowments abundant in labor), and North-South integration (between countries of dissimilar 
levels of development and dissimilar endowments). In each of these cases, studies typically 
stress the difference between the impact on FDI between RIA partners, and that on FDI inflows 
from outside sources. 
Among recent studies of North-North agreements, Dunning (2000) finds that since 
Europe’s 1985 launch of its Internal Market Program, both intra-EC and extra-EC FDI have been 
stimulated, particularly the latter; FDI has grown the most in knowledge-intensive activities; and 
the growth of FDI has been complementary to the growth of trade. Of South-South agreements, 
Chudnovsky and López (2001) find that FDI in Mercosur has been largely from extra-regional 
sources; it has taken the form primarily of mergers and acquisitions; it has displaced domestic 
investment; and has been directed towards supplying the internal market. Of North-South 
agreements, Waldkirch (2001) finds that NAFTA has substantially increased FDI in Mexico, 
mostly from intra-regional partners Canada and the United States, and infers that the agreement’s 
impetus to vertical integration is the likely explanation.  
Blomström and Kokko (1997) take a similar approach, although they group three case 
studies together to work towards a more comprehensive analysis. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade 
Agreement, their example of a North-North RIA, reduced the relative importance of intra-
regional FDI for both countries but increased extra-regional FDI to Canada. In neither case was 
the effect dramatic, though, a fact attributed to the lack of major changes in economic policy 
resulting from the agreement.
7 The South-South RIA, Mercosur, witnessed a substantial 
expansion of extra-regional FDI, though macroeconomic stability is found to be a more 
important determinant of the inflows than the RIA. The North-South RIA, NAFTA, is found to 
have witnessed a dramatic increase in FDI inflows, particularly extra-regional FDI to Mexico, 
                                                           
7 Tariffs between US and Canada were already low at the time the agreement was signed. 
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 due to a combination of broader policy reforms undertaken contemporaneously in Mexico as 
well as Mexico’s proximity to the U.S. market and its abundance of labor.
8  
The case studies methodology has the advantage that one can take into account the 
institutional detail of the countries under study when reaching conclusions about the impact of 
integration on FDI. At the same time, however, it illustrates the difficulty of drawing strong 
conclusions when so many other variables complicate the particular cases.  In Mercosur, for 
example, it is hard to disentangle the effect of the RIA from that of macroeconomic stabilization, 
which occurred at approximately the same time. In Mexico, the effect of NAFTA is hard to 
distinguish from that of other changes in FDI-related policies that took place contemporaneously. 
Moreover, the particular circumstances of each of the cases studied make it difficult to 
extrapolate the findings to other potential RIAs, particularly when these do not share the same 
context. To what degree was FDI influenced by the unique circumstances of each set of countries 
and to what degree was it driven by their RIA? Case studies, however well informed, cannot 
provide definitive answers.
9 
Another way to proceed, which provides a nice complement to the case studies, is to 
control for some of those circumstances within a large sample of countries, all of which are 
sources or hosts of FDI, and most of which are parties to RIAs. There are enough RIAs in 
existence, and enough bilateral FDI data, to try to sort out quantitatively the effects of an RIA 
from the effects of other circumstances. In a companion paper, Levy Yeyati, Stein and Daude 
(2002) have studied the relationship between integration and FDI using bilateral data on FDI 
stocks for a large sample of countries. In the rest of the paper, we will discuss their results, and 
use them to draw conclusions regarding the potential impact of the FTAA on the location of 
foreign direct investment. Before presenting the evidence, however, it is useful to discuss briefly 
the different channels through which RIAs may affect FDI. 
 
Effects on FDI from insiders. If the source and host countries become members of the same RIA, 
the impact on bilateral FDI is theoretically ambiguous and depends on the kind of FDI that 
predominates. If FDI is horizontal, with tariff jumping as its motive, the reduction in trade 
                                                           
8 Blomström and Kokko’s study emphasizes the increase of extra-regional FDI flows to Mexico, while Waldkirch’s 
emphasizes intra-regional flows to Mexico, because of changes in the data found in the time between their studies 
(1997 and 2001, respectively).  
9 The problem is one of too many variables that may matter, but too few observations from which to make 
inferences. 
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 barriers implicit in the RIA will probably lead to a reduction in FDI, as trade and foreign 
investment are alternative ways to serve the domestic market. If FDI is vertical, with integration 
of stages of production as its motive, the RIA should increase FDI, as transactions costs to 
engage in vertical integration across international borders are reduced. The net effect may 
depend, among other things, on the size of trade barriers, as well as the similarities in factor 
proportions, since these two factors affect the vertical vs. horizontal composition of FDI. Note 
that, regardless of its impact on total FDI, an RIA will likely change the composition of FDI 
from horizontal to vertical.
10  
 
Extended market effect. The entrance of a country into an RIA may make it a more enticing host 
of FDI in activities subject to economies of scale through an extended market effect, particularly 
if the FDI is horizontal. Mercosur, for example, may have become a more attractive market for 
outside sources after the formation of the Customs Union, making it more worthwhile for foreign 
firms to “jump” the common external tariff instead of supplying each individual country through 
trade. The extension of the market due to a RIA may encourage vertical FDI as well, since it 
reduces the costs of locating different stages of production in different countries within the 
region. In fact, this effect can also be present for the case of FDI from source countries within the 
same RIA. Thus, whatever the motive for FDI, the extended market effect of a host country’s 
entry into an RIA should result in more FDI for the RIA as a whole.  
Yet within the RIA there may be winners and losers.  Notwithstanding the increased FDI 
brought to the region as a whole, there may be a redistributive effect of FDI within the region. 
Before the RIA is launched, for instance, a multinational corporation might have horizontal FDI 
in each of the countries in the region. When barriers to trade within the region are eliminated, the 
firm may choose to concentrate production in a single country (perhaps the one that offers a 
more attractive overall package) and supply the rest of the countries through trade.
11  
 
                                                           
10 An RIA can also increase bilateral FDI, regardless of its motives, if it includes investment provisions to liberalize 
capital flows, homogenize legal norms, and set up institutions to handle cross-border disputes.  
11 One of the factors that may explain who loses and who wins in this game is country size. If there is some 
uncertainty regarding the future of the RIA, firms may not want to be trapped in a small country. The biggest losers 
could be medium-sized countries, since small countries are more likely to be supplied by trade rather than FDI with 
or without the RIA. If the RIA is credible, central location may be a more important factor. Beyond market size and 
location, countries that offer a more attractive overall package for foreign investors due to the quality of their 
institutions, the quality of their  labor force, the development of their infrastructure, or their tax treatment of 
multinationals, will be more likely to be winners in this redistributive game. 
11
 Diversion/dilution effect. When a source country enters into or expands a RIA, host countries 
may experience investment diversion or dilution.  If membership in a regional integration 
agreement makes each member a more attractive host of FDI—as it does in the vertical model— 
then the RIA will make non-members appear relatively less attractive.  We call this effect FDI 
diversion, in analogy to Viner’s (1950) classic trade diversion concept: FDI from a source to 
non-partners may decline as the source enters a RIA.
12 
A similar effect may be experienced by members of an RIA when the agreement is 
enlarged. Take, for instance, the potential effects of the FTAA on FDI flows from the U.S. to 
Mexico. To the extent that U.S. investment in Mexico is intended to exploit some locational 
advantages of Mexico, then as the preferential access of Mexico to the U.S. is diluted by the 






In order to look at the impact of RIAs on FDI, we used data on bilateral FDI stocks from the 
OECD  International Direct Investment Statistics. The dataset covers FDI from 20 source 
countries, all of them from the OECD, to 60 host countries, from 1982 through 1999. One 
shortcoming of this data is that it does not cover FDI between developing countries. Yet, it is the 
most complete source available for bilateral FDI, which is a key ingredient for studying the 
effects of integration on foreign investment. 
The methodology used in Levy Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2002) is loosely based on the 
gravity model, which has been employed widely in the literature on the determinants of bilateral 
trade, and has more recently been used to study the determinants of FDI.
14 The traditional gravity 
                                                           
12 As in Viner’s trade diversion, the formation of a RIA may divert FDI from the most efficient location to a partner. 
For example, a US firm may locate in Mexico, following NAFTA, the production of an intermediate input it may 
have otherwise located in Costa Rica, in the absence of the preferential access enjoyed by Mexico. What we call 
investment diversion in this paper is the loss suffered by Costa Rica, as well as other countries, as a result of the 
creation of NAFTA.  
13 Dilution is conceptually different from diversion: going back to the example of NAFTA and US FDI to Mexico 
and Costa Rica, dilution in a way is the result of leveling the playing field, at least for a certain group of countries. 
In this case, with the FTAA, Costa Rica and Mexico will now be playing under the same rules, and FDI will go to 
the most efficient location within the region. 
14 See Eaton and Tamura (1994), Frankel and Wei (1997), Wei (1997, 2000), Blonigen and Davis (2000), Stein and 
Daude (2001) and Levy Yeyati, Panizza and Stein (2001). In its simplest formulation it the gravity model presumes 
that bilateral trade flows (or bilateral FDI stocks) are related positively to the product of the GDPs of both 
12
 model is modified in a number of ways, by including: i) country pair fixed effects, to control for 
all the characteristics of country pairs that are invariant over time, such as distance, common 
border, similarity of factor proportions, as well as other variables which may be relevant for FDI 
location but which may be difficult to observe (including these pair fixed effects allows us to 
focus on the effects of changes in RIAs on the bilateral FDI within country pairs, leaving out the 
cross-sectional dimension); ii) year dummies to control for the spectacular increase in FDI over 
time; and iii) a number of variables associated  with the effects of regional integration.  
The first regional integration variable is Same RIA, a dummy variable that indicates 
whether the source and the host countries belong to the same regional integration agreement.
15 
This variable captures a combination of channels: tariff-jumping, international vertical 
integration, and the potential effect of investment provisions on FDI, and the expected impact is 
ambiguous. A second integration variable is Extended Market Host, which captures the size of 
the extended market of the host country.
16 For example, for the case of Brazil in the years before 
Mercosur, Extended Market Host is the log of Brazil’s GDP at the time; for the years after 
Mercosur, it takes the value of the log of the combined GDP of the four Mercosur countries. 
Following the previous discussion, we expect an increase in the size of the extended market to 
have positive effects on FDI for the RIA as a whole. Finally, a third integration variable is 
Extended Market Source, which captures FDI diversion/dilution effects. We expect its 
coefficient to have a negative sign, suggesting that FDI to a host country diminishes when firms 
in the source country have other FTA partners in which to locate their investments.  
The results of the regressions are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Column 1 in Table 1 
presents the basic results, where the dependent variable is log (1+FDI).
17 The coefficient for 
Same RIA is positive and highly significant, suggesting that on average, any potential loss of FDI 
due to the tariff-jumping argument associated with horizontal FDI is more than offset by other 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
economies and negatively to the distance between them. Other variables typically added are whether the countries 
have a common border, common language, colonial links, etc. 
15 The dummy takes a value of 1 for the case of free trade areas, customs unions or single markets, but not when 
countries share membership in preferential trade agreements, in which trade barriers among members are reduced 
but not eliminated. The source for this variable is Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997). See Appendix for list of RIAs 
considered in the paper. 
16 It is defined as the log of the joint GDP of all the countries to which the host has tariff-free access due to common 
membership in a FTA (we include the host’s own GDP as well). 
17 The reason to add 1 to FDI before taking logs is to avoid losing the observations with zero FDI, which represent 
nearly 40 percent of the sample, and provide useful information. For a discussion of the methodological issues 
associated to the treatment of the observations with zero FDI, see Levy Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2002).  
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 effects (vertical integration, investment provisions) that operate in the opposite direction. The 
size of the coefficient suggests that a source country will increase FDI to a host country by 
around 27 percent once they become partners in a trade agreement.
18 The host and source 
extended market variables are also significant, and have the expected signs, positive for host and 
negative for source. The coefficient for extended market host, which can be interpreted as an 
elasticity, suggests that a one percent increase in the size of the extended market (after 
controlling for the host country’s GDP) increases FDI from all sources by 0.10 percent.
19 
Similarly, a one percent increase in the size of the extended market of the source country, after 
controlling for the source country GDP, reduces FDI to all hosts by 0.05 percent. Columns 2 
through 4 show that the results are robust to the inclusion of other variables which may explain 
FDI location, such as the stock of privatization to date (to control for the fact that most FDI 
linked to privatization is in non-tradables), the rate of inflation (to control for macroeconomic 
conditions), and an index of institutional quality.
20 
An interesting exercise that provides a notion of the magnitude of these effects is to 
compare the impact that the creation of the FTAA would have for FDI from the United States to 
Mexico and Argentina, according to the basic model of column 1. Consider first the case of 
Argentina. Since it does not have an FTA with the United States, it would benefit from the direct 
effect of sharing an FTA with the source, increasing the US-originated FDI stock by 27 percent. 
In addition, the Argentinean economy would become more attractive to FDI because of the 
extension of its market from Mercosur to the FTAA (which using GDP data for 1999, implies 
that the extended market increases by a factor of 10). This increase in the size of the extended 
market would lead to an increase of 26.8 percent in the stock of FDI originating in the US (as 
well as other source countries).
21 On the other hand, the source extended market effect would 
partially offset these increases. The FTAA, however, would only represent an increase of around 
16 percent in the extended market of the United States, with an associated decline in US FDI of 
0.71 percent due to the diversion/dilution effect.
22 Altogether, the overall effect of the creation of 
                                                           
18 The coefficient for Same RIA in the Table is 0.24. Since FDI is in logs, it is necessary to transform this coefficient, 
by computing exp(0.24)-1=0.27 
19 While this effect appears at first sight to be small, it can actually make a big difference, as will become clear 
below. As an example, the formation of NAFTA increased the extended market of Mexico by a factor of 18! 
20 The only exception is the extended market source, which loses significance in one of the regressions. See 
Appendix for variable definitions and sources 
21 exp(0.1022*ln(10.21))-1 = 0.268 
22 exp(-0.0481*ln(1.16))-1 = -0.0071 
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 the FTAA would be a substantial increase of around 60 percent in the United States’ direct 
investment position in Argentina.
23 
The result for Mexico would be quite different. Since Mexico and the U.S. are already 
members of the same FTA, the FTAA would have no direct effect. The increase of the extended 
market of Mexico would be lower than that of the U.S., as Mexico already had FTAs with 
Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia at the end of the sample period, yielding an extension of the 
host market of only 13 percent, and a corresponding increase in bilateral stocks of 1.25 percent. 
Netting the source extended market effect, calculated in the previous paragraph as –0.71 percent, 
we arrive at a net increase of US FDI stocks in Mexico of around 0.5 percent.
24 
The numbers in this simple exercise can illustrate potential asymmetries in the impact of 
the FTAA for different countries—but they must be taken with a great deal of caution. The 
estimates that we use represent the average impact of our regional integration variables over the 
whole sample. However, the impact may differ according to the characteristics of the countries in 
question. For example, the impact of Same RIA may depend on the horizontal or vertical nature 
of the investments, which in turn may depend on the degree of protection in the host country, or 
the similarity in factor proportions vis-à-vis the source. Other things equal, closed economies are 
expected to have a larger share of horizontal FDI, which according to the theory should decrease 
with regional integration. Economies that are similar in their factor endowments are not expected 
to have a substantial volume of vertical FDI, suggesting that FDI between similar countries 
should not react much to integration. 
The difference in the impact of same RIA for countries of different characteristics is 
examined in Table 2. In column 2, we include an interaction term in which Same RIA is 
multiplied by the average openness in the host country throughout the sample period. The 
interaction term is positive and significant, suggesting that the impact of common membership in 
an RIA will increase with the openness of the host country. Column 3 presents the results when 
Same RIA is interacted with the absolute difference in the percentage of the labor force with 
secondary education between the source and host countries, averaged over the period.
25 In 
column 4, we include both interaction terms together. The coefficients for the interaction terms 
                                                           
23 1.27*1.268*(1 – 0.0071) –1=0.60 
24 1.2569*(1-0.0071)-1=0.005 
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 are very similar to those of the previous columns, and so is the Same RIA impact evaluated at the 
mean of openness and factor proportions. The effect of Same RIA on FDI as a function of 
different levels of openness and difference in factor proportions is presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Interestingly, Figure 1 suggests that common membership in RIAs may lower FDI for host 
countries that are below a critical level of openness (imports plus exports over GDP below 50 
percent). Within Latin America, countries such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia are well 
below this critical level. 
 
Simulating the Impact of the FTAA on FDI to its Member Countries 
 
We have in our sample 10 countries that are scheduled to launch the FTAA in 2005. These are 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, the US and 
Venezuela. In what follows, we simulate the potential impact of the FTAA in each of these 
countries, using the regressions presented above. In each case, we look at the effects from inside 
sources (the US and Canada) as well as from the rest of the world. To do this, we first use the 
coefficients of our baseline regression (column 1 in Tables 1 and 2) and estimate the FDI stocks 
that each country would have from each source country if the FTAA were implemented. That is, 
we compute the fitted value of the FDI stock using the coefficients estimated in the baseline 
regression but replacing the variables Same FTA, Extended Market Source and Extended Market 
Host for the values they would have assumed had the FTAA entered into force in 1999. Then, we 
aggregate this value by host country according to whether the FDI stocks come from USA and 
Canada or from the rest of the world and calculate the percentage change in the stocks relative to 
their fitted values in the absence of FTAA.  
Table 3 shows the results for the ten future FTAA members represented in our sample. 
The first thing to be noticed is that the impact on FDI stocks are exactly the same for countries 
that belong to the same trading bloc, like Argentina and Brazil. This is an expected result since 
the changes in the explanatory variables we are taking into account, extended market host, 
extended market source and same FTA, are equal for these both countries. Accordingly, each of 
the countries in Mercosur would increase its stocks from USA and Canada by approximately 60 
percent and from the rest of the world by almost 26 percent. The figures for the countries of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
25 One shortcoming of this variable is that it is only available for about three quarters of the observations. Note that 
we do not include this variable by itself in the regressions, since it is already captured by the country-pair fixed 
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 Comunidad Andina are larger (82 percent from insiders, and 44 percent from the rest of the 
world). The countries in which the estimated impact is largest are Panama, Costa Rica and Chile, 
which have the greatest increase in their extended market size. At the other end of the spectrum 
are Mexico, Canada and the US, all cases in which the effects would be minimal. 
The fact that the results are similar for countries within each bloc does not mean, 
however, that the distribution of the FDI gains will be equally distributed among the bloc 
members. It simply shows that we cannot uncover the asymmetric effects within each bloc with 
this model. In the second panel of the table we repeat the exercise including the interaction 
between Same RIA and Openness. As we expected, more open economies would benefit more 
from the FTAA. Notice in particular the reduction in the impact from the US and Canada in the 
case of Argentina and Brazil, which are the least open economies in the group. Remember that 
the extended market effect (from all sources) in the case of Argentina in the example discussed 
before was around 26.8 percent. The total impact from insiders in this model is around 2 percent, 
which suggests that the direct same RIA effect is in these cases negative. In the third panel, we 
add the interaction of same FTA with the difference in factor proportions (corresponding to 
equation 4 in Table 2). 
Naturally, the figures for the impact of the FTAA on FDI obtained in these simulations 
should only be taken as indicative. As is obvious from Table 3, they change considerably 
depending on the specification used for the simulations. In spite of this, we believe that they 
provide a very useful first look at the potential impact of the FTAA on FDI. The paper suggests 
that this impact is statistically significant, economically important, and very unevenly 
distributed.  
 
FDI Policy in Integrating Countries  
 
The discussion throughout this paper has implicitly equated gains in FDI with gains in general 
welfare. The national “winners” from RIAs are associated with those whose FDI inflows 
increase, and the national “losers” are those whose FDI inflows decline. However, the question 
of whether FDI generates positive welfare effects for the host countries has been a subject of 
great debate. While most authors believe that FDI tends to be beneficial, there are some who 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
effects. 
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 believe that foreign investment is at best a mixed blessing, bringing with it a measure of harm 
that may outweigh the good.   
The presumption that FDI is good is based on the idea that FDI may generate positive 
spillovers for the rest of the economy.  These spillovers may flow through a variety of channels. 
If the foreign firm is technologically more advanced than most domestic companies, the 
interaction of its technicians, engineers and managers with domestic firms may result in 
knowledge spillovers. Positive spillovers may also arise if the foreign firm trains workers who 
are eventually hired by domestic firms. Other possible sources of spillovers identified in the 
literature are related to the development of new inputs spurred by the demand from 
multinationals, which then become available to domestic producers (Rodríguez-Clare, 1996), or 
to the example set by exporting multinationals, which may induce domestic producers to become 
exporters as well  (see Aitken, Hanson and Harrison, 1997). Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee 
(1998) find evidence that FDI has a positive effect on growth, provided the level of human 
capital in the host country is sufficiently high. Thus, in order to benefit from the advanced 
technology introduced by foreign firms, the host country has to have capacity to absorb it.
26  
However, FDI may also generate negative spillovers.  Domestic firms may be displaced 
by the foreign firm, or may find that the cost of factors of production increases as a result of the 
foreign investment. At the same time, foreign firms tend to import a larger share of their inputs. 
This may generate balance of payments concerns, and at the same time affect domestic suppliers 
of intermediate inputs, whose demand may decline when a domestic firm is sold to foreign 
nationals. While most of the earlier empirical literature on the subject supports the presence of 
positive externalities, recent work based on firm-level data has found some evidence of negative 
externalities instead. An example is the work of Aitken and Harrison (1999) who find, for the 
case of Venezuela, that growth of total factor productivity was lower for domestic firms in 
sectors in which FDI was greater. These authors focus on within-industry spillovers, however. 
Kugler (2000) and IDB (2002) find evidence of important positive inter-industry spillovers for 
the cases of Colombia and Mexico, respectively.
27 
 
                                                           
26 For a more complete discussion of spillovers from FDI, see Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Hanson (2001). 
27 Kugler (2000) argues that the lack of intra-industry spillovers may be due to the fact that foreign affiliates will 
appropriate as many of the benefits as possible of their imported technology, and thus they try to prevent spillovers 
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 This discussion of the potential benefits and costs of FDI suggests that not all FDI carries similar 
benefits. In particular, FDI may be more beneficial if it targets more advanced industries (so that 
potential technological spillovers are larger); if it establishes strong forward and backward 
linkages with domestic firms (which may thereby absorb the spillovers); if it exports part of the 
production (relaxing balance of payments concerns, and inducing domestic firms to follow suit); 
and if domestic firms have capacity to absorb those spillovers. The key question is, what kind of 
policies can countries adopt in order to ensure that the resulting FDI inflows are of the beneficial 
kind?  In addition, how does regional integration affect the desirability and effectiveness of those 
policies? And how can countries maximize the FDI benefits associated with agreements such as 
the FTAA? 
Some of the policies that countries have traditionally used to try to get the most out of 
FDI are technology transfer and performance requirements. Domestic affiliates of foreign owned 
firms may be required to train domestic workers to certain standards, to locate R&D activities in 
the country, to use a minimum content of local inputs, to export a certain proportion of their 
output, or to employ certain technologies. Yet the evidence suggests that performance 
requirements have been ineffective. Blomström, Kokko and Zejan (2000, Chapter 13) offer 
strong evidence that the requirements actually reduce multinationals’ employment of technology, 
and weaker evidence that they increase capital imports as well. In addition, some of these 
requirements, such as local content or trade balancing requirements, are either prohibited or 
being phased out under current WTO rules. 
Whether or not performance requirements are beneficial under some circumstances, they 
are least likely to be so in circumstances of regional integration. RIAs tend to promote vertical 
FDI over horizontal; they also tend to extend the market for horizontal FDI from individual 
countries to that of the RIA, thus making FDI more footloose within the region. While a 
horizontal multinational firm may accept performance requirements if it is necessary to serve a 
particular country’s protected market, enlargement of the market with an RIA allows the firm to 
choose as its host whichever member country has the fewest requirements. A vertical 
multinational, even more, may simply choose another country for a particular stage of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
from leaking to their competitors. On the other hand, they may want to upgrade the technological capabilities of a 
supplier, which explains the existence of inter-industry spillovers.  
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 production.
28 Performance requirements, in other words, may be best suited for a state of the 
world that RIAs are designed deliberately to dismantle. The implication for regional integration 
policy is that, where it comes to an RIA’s investment chapter, national treatment may work 
better than any alternative to help a country avoid becoming an FDI loser.
29  
If performance requirements are not helpful in attracting FDI to integrating countries, 
which policies would be? And, more specifically, what can countries do to become FDI winners 
in the regional integration game? With regards to this last question, the evidence discussed in this 
paper suggests that the FDI gains of RIAs are unlikely to be distributed evenly, and that the gains 
may be smaller for countries that have factor endowments similar to those of the source 
countries, and are relatively closed to international trade.  
While not much can be done to change a country’s factor endowments in the short run, 
openness is certainly amenable to policy action. Not only would openness amplify the impact of 
the RIA on FDI. It will also change the composition of FDI, from horizontal to vertical. Since 
horizontal FDI sometimes occurs due to the existence to distortions (high protection), while 
vertical FDI tends to follow comparative advantages, this shift may strengthen the benefits a 
country derives from multinational activities. Beyond the impact of factor endowments and 
openness discussed above, Levy Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2002) show that countries that present 
a more attractive overall package to foreign investors are also likely to gain more FDI from the 
formation of RIAs. This begs the question of how to enhance a country’s attractiveness. 
In this regard, one can think of two polar strategies. The first one, which has been 
compared to a “beauty contest” by Oman (2000), involves improving the quality of institutions, 
educating the labor force and developing the country’s infrastructure. The second one entails 
aggressive use of fiscal and financial incentives to attract foreign investors. This simplified 
division entails obviously a false dichotomy, as countries tend to do a little of both, but it still 
provides a useful way of organizing the discussion.  
One important advantage of the “beauty contest” view is that improvements in 
infrastructure, education or the quality of the institutional environment will certainly benefit 
domestic citizens and firms, regardless of their impact on FDI. Beyond these general benefits, 
                                                           
28 Coordinated adoption of performance requirements may solve the problem of location within the extended 
market, but it does not stop vertical FDI from seeking more convenient locations. 
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 there is evidence suggesting that improving the quality of institutions can have a large impact on 
FDI (see, for example, Stein and Daude, 2001). In particular, these authors show that reducing 
excessive regulation, enforcing property rights, improving the quality of the bureaucracy and 
reducing corruption are some of the most promising policies in terms of attracting foreign 
investors.
30  
The evidence regarding the impact of education and infrastructure on the location of FDI 
is weaker.
31 However, this does not mean that countries should not pursue these policies. While 
education may not contribute to the total amount of FDI a country receives, it may affect the 
benefits host countries derive from FDI through a variety of channels. First, an educated labor 
force may affect the type of FDI a country receives, shifting it toward more advanced industries, 
which may generate larger spillovers. Second, for a given type investment, education increases 
the capacity of the labor force and of domestic firms to absorb spillovers. In addition, foreign 
firms that are attracted by an educated labor force become a strong constituency in favor of 
further improvements in education.
32 In contrast, foreign firms that are attracted by cheap labor 
will probably lobby for the government to ensure the continuous availability of cheap labor, 
which not sound that appealing as a development strategy. 
The case for aggressive competition in incentives is not as clear. To the extent that FDI 
produces positive spillovers, it makes sense for governments to offer incentives to potential 
investors in order to lure them into their territory.
33 Provided there are economies of scale, 
eliminating trade barriers will induce firms to produce in just one location within a bloc and 
serve the extended market from this location. Competition among countries for FDI may become 
too intense however. The problem is distributional in nature: if social rates of return on an 
investment are similar across countries, foreign firms will be able to extract most of the benefits 
associated with the investment. Improving the distribution of the benefits of FDI in favor of host 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29 The FTAA draft, as of spring 2002, includes in its investment chapter an article on performance requirements that 
would proscribe them. But the text is thoroughly bracketed – and includes several bracketed exceptions. The 
question is under negotiation. (See http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ftaadraft/eng/draft_e.asp.  Last consulted 5-2-02). 
30 These authors show that a one standard deviation improvement in an index of institutional quality developed by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) results in an increase in bilateral FDI of 130 percent!  
31 See Stein and Daude (2001). 
32 This is clearly the case of Intel in Costa Rica, where the enrollment in engineering schools has doubled in a matter 
of only a couple of years. 
33 This argument goes through as long as the government is considered a social planner seeking to maximize the 
country’s welfare. A potential problem with incentive-based competition, however, is that negotiations with 
potential entrants are rarely transparent and open to public scrutiny, so they could lead to arbitrariness and 
corruption. 
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 countries may require some form of coordinated action among the region’s hosts.
34  As difficult 
as this coordination may be for the case of South-South RIAs, it may be an even greater 
challenge for a North-South RIA such as the FTAA, where the interests of source and host 
countries are more likely to come into conflict.  
 
                                                           
34 See Fernández-Arias, Hausmann and Stein (2001). These authors show that the complete elimination of incentive-
based competition is not the optimal solution for host countries and, under some circumstances, may leave then 
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 Table 1. The Impact of Regional Integration on FDI 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable Ln(FDI Stock +1) 
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GDP Host  0.1912  0.18  0.2326  0.2403 
  (5.864)*** (5.540)*** (6.512)*** (5.567)*** 
GDP Source  0.518  0.518  0.5152  0.4435 
  (7.259)*** (7.288)*** (6.961)*** (5.473)*** 
Extended Market Host  0.1022  0.1118  0.1062  0.0534 
  (5.684)*** (6.234)*** (5.663)*** (1.926)* 
Extended Market Source  -0.0481  -0.051  -0.031  -0.0183 
 (2.730)***  (2.905)***  (1.699)*  (0.767) 
Same  RIA  0.2393 0.2821 0.2768 0.2086 
  (3.983)*** (4.703)*** (4.630)*** (2.717)*** 
Privatizations    0.0411 0.0351 0.0462 
    (9.609)*** (8.026)*** (8.229)*** 
Inflation     0.0471  0.0514 
     (4.013)***  (3.272)*** 
Institutions     0.137 
     (3.522)*** 
Constant -6.9546  -6.9168  -7.614  -6.2566 
  (7.260)*** (7.249)*** (7.510)*** (5.607)*** 
      
Observations  12483 12483 11421 7666 
Number  of  paircode  1083 1083 1045 994 
R-sq  between  0.5126 0.5072 0.5056 0.5126 
F  pair  dummies  [61.65]*** [61.54]*** [59.95]*** [48.15]*** 
F  year  dummies  [42.12]*** [40.45]*** [37.28]*** [23.45]*** 
  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
  Absolute value of F statistics in square brackets. 





 Table 2: Openness, Factor Proportions, and the Impact of RIAs on FDI 
Fixed Effects Estimation: Dependent Variable Ln(FDI Stock +1) 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
GDP Host  0.2038  0.1992  0.1136  0.1075 
 (6.342)***  (6.199)***  (3.049)***  (2.888)*** 
GDP Source  0.5175  0.514  0.4994  0.4939 
 (7.250)***  (7.205)***  (6.192)***  (6.131)*** 
Extended Market Host  0.0884  0.0925  0.0918  0.0968 
 (5.223)***  (5.465)***  (5.051)***  (5.321)*** 
Extended Market Source  -0.048  -0.0489  -0.0115  -0.0133 
 (2.722)***  (2.772)***  (0.563)  (0.653) 
Same RIA  0.2395  -0.3692  -0.0482  -0.7146 
 (3.980)***  (2.370)**  (0.501)  (4.007)*** 
Same RIA * Average Openness    0.009    0.0096 
   (4.235)***    (4.437)*** 
Same RIA * Abs.Diff. % Labor Force with Secondary
Education     0.0113  0.0127 
     (2.561)**  (2.871)*** 
Constant -6.9217  -6.8741  -6.0459  -5.9588 
 (7.225)***  (7.180)***  (5.533)***  (5.458)*** 
        
Observations 12483  12483  9758  9758 
Number of pairs  1083  1083  828  828 
R-sq between  0.5103  0.5147  0.4623  0.4623 
F pair dummies  [61.69]***  [61.26]***  [57.00]***  [56.44]*** 
F year dummies  [42.13]***  [42.10]***  [35.88]***  [35.95]*** 
Total Effect of Same RIA (MIN)    -0.197 -0.048 -0.551 
Total Effect of Same RIA (MEAN)    0.283 0.181 0.245 
Total Effect of Same RIA (MAX)     2.876 0.706 3.687 
MIN Average Openness    16.97     16.97 
MEAN  Average Openness    72.25    73.08 
MAX Average Openness    370.25    370.25 
MIN Abs.Diff. % Labor Force with Secondary Education      0.03  0.03 
MEAN Abs.Diff. % Labor Force with Secondary Education      20.32  20.32 
MAX Abs.Diff. % Labor Force with Secondary Education        66.72  66.72 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. 
Absolute value of F statistics in square brackets. 




 Table 3. Simulating the Impact of the FTAA 
 
Baseline Regression  Regression with Openness  Regression with Openness 




  From ROW  From USA and
Canada 
  From ROW  From USA
and Canada 
  From ROW 
Argentina 58.93  26.05  1.87  27.44 21.70  28.88 
Brazil 58.93  26.05  2.71  27.44  22.62  28.88 
Canada 0.65  1.43  0.70 1.50  1.35  1.57 
Chile 98.13  57.15  82.44  60.54  56.97  64.10 
Colombia 81.81  44.20  34.20  46.72 11.43  49.35 
Costa Rica  124.92  78.40  153.06  83.35  155.83  88.57 
Mexico 0.03  0.81  0.05 0.84  0.67  0.88 
Panama 136.11  87.27  161.87  92.91  206.02  98.86 
USA 0.65  1.43  0.70  1.50  1.35  1.57 



























Note: The coefficients correspond to the Regression 4 of Table 3, and are evaluated at the mean of skill difference. 
Figure 2.
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Table A.1. Free Trade Agreements 
 
FTA Creation    Members 
European Union 
(EU) 
1957  Austria (since 1995), Belgium, Denmark (since 1973), 
Finland (since 1995), France, Germany, Greece (since 1981), 
Ireland (since 1973), Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal (since 1986), Spain (since 1986), Sweden (since 
1995), United Kingdom (since 1973) 
European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) 
1960  Austria (until 1994), Denmark (until 1972), Finland (1986-
1994), Iceland (since 1970), Liechtenstein (since 1991), 
Norway, Portugal (until 1985), Sweden (until 1994), 
Switzerland, United Kingdom (until 1972) 
European Economic 
Area (EEA) 
1994  All members of the European Union, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway 
Central European 
Free Trade Area 
(CEFTA) 
1992  Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, Slovenia 
(since 1995) 
North American Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
1989  Canada, USA, Mexico (since 1994) 
Mercado Común del 
Sur (MERCOSUR) 








1959  Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
Group of Three   1994  Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 





1992  Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 




1983  Australia, New Zealand 
South African 
Custom Union 





Table A.2. Data Sources 
 
Variable Source 
Privatizations  Chong, A., and F. López-de-Silanes. 2002. “Privatization and Labor Force 
Restructuring Around the World.” Manuscript Yale University 
(forthcoming NBER) 
Inflation  International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics. 
FDI Stock  OECD. 2000. International Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook. Paris, 
France: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Factor Endowments  Spilimbergo, A., J.L. Londoño, and M. Székely. 1999. “Income 
Distribution, Factor Endowments, and Trade Openness.” Journal of 
Development Economics 59(1): 77-101. 
Distance, Border, Common 
Language and Colonial Links  
The World Economic Factbook, CIA website 
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html   
GDP World  Bank.  World Development Indicators. 
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